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Japan has had a profound influence on Southeast Asia. Whether it is measured by Japan’s 
often brutal, but ultimately liberating, war-time occupation of the region, or by the more 
recent economic interaction, Japan has played a major part in shaping Southeast Asia’s 
political and economic development. At one level this is hardly surprising. Japan, as T..J. 
Pempel (1999: 27) reminds us, ‘remains the Gulliver in a region of economic Lilliputs’. 
In an East Asian region in which it continues to account for around two thirds of 
economic output, Japan towers over its neighbours and inevitably exercises a major 
influence through sheer economic weight. And yet the most striking quality of this 
undoubted economic power, is that it is not matched by an equivalent political influence 
– or certainly not at the conspicuous level of international diplomacy. This chapter will 
attempt to account for this paradox.  
 
In order to try and make sense of Japan’s complex and contradictory relations with 
Southeast Asia I shall adopt an approach that is situated squarely in the increasingly 
influential tradition of international political-economy (IPE). Although there are a 
number of divergent positions subsumed under the IPE rubric, its central concerns 
involve exploring the relationship between power and wealth, and extending our 
understanding of the interaction between international relations and economics (see 
Higgott 1994). In terms of the models identified in the editors’ introductory chapter, this 
approach is most closely aligned with Marxist-derived radical political economy. One of 
the main insights and motivating principles of this theoretical framework is that the 
political and the economic are deeply interconnected and simply cannot be separated in 
the manner implied by specialist academic disciplines. IPE also generates distinctive and 
important analytical insights and questions. In the context of a discussion of Japan’s 
regional role, key questions revolve around the relationship between economic and 
political power: why has Japan failed to develop a political presence to match its 
economic might? What influence have wider geo-political and strategic considerations 
had on regional relationships? What implications does the development and 
contemporary position of Japan’s distinctive political-economy have for the region and 
relations with key actors like the United States (US)? Answers to such questions 
necessitate considering a much wider range of factors than conventional economic  or 
political science perspectives allow. 
 
If we want to understand why there has been such a noteworthy divergence between 
Japan’s political and economic roles, we need to look beyond East Asia and consider the 
wider international order in which the region is embedded. One of the most profound 
influences on Japan’s distinctive developmental trajectory over the last 50 years or so has 
been Japan’s war-time experiences. The Second World War, and Japan’s relationship 
with the US in particular, have shaped and moulded Japan’s subsequent approaches to 
economic and foreign policy, with long-term implications for both Japan’s own place in 
the world, and for the course of regional development more generally. As a consequence, 
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despite Japan’s phenomenal rise as an economic power, it has not enjoyed a concomitant 
political influence; unlike earlier rising powers, economic might has not translated into 
wider systemic or ‘hegemonic’ influence. Japan, in short, has remained a ‘quasi 
hegemon’. 
 
The first part of this chapter traces the origins and evolution of Japan’s quasi-hegemony. 
I argue that Japan’s preoccupation with economic reconstruction and expansion,  its 
reliance on the US for  security, and its general reluctance to adopt an active and 
independent foreign policy position has lent a distinctively mercantilist cast to its external 
policies, which systematically privileges the economic over the political. The second 
section of the chapter looks at the impact of this stance on relations with Southeast Asia. I 
shall suggest that unless Japan develops a greater capacity and willingness to play a more 
prominent political role in keeping with its economic power, even this latter influence 
may be eroded. As Japan’s domestic economy continues to languish, Japan’s importance  
as a source of investment, as a market, and as a potential regional role model are 
inevitably diminished, with potentially significant consequences for Japan’s international 
political position. The point to re-emphasise at the outset, therefore, is that only by 
considering the complex, inter-connected continuum of Japan’s political practices and 
economic structures can we hope to understand both Japan’s domestic position and the 
way this has influenced its external relations. 
 
Japan’s quasi hegemony 
 
Japan’s economic development in the post-war period has been, until relatively recently 
at least, routinely described as ‘miraculous’. Indeed, it is important to remember that 
Japan’s rise from the ruin and defeat of World War II to its position as the second largest 
economy in the world is an unparalleled and astonishing achievement. Whatever 
difficulties Japan may currently be facing, this experience remains a crucially important 
exemplar of a successful state-led form of economic development that not only 
contradicts much ‘Western’ economic thinking (Fallows 1993), but which has provided a  
role model for a number of other states in the East Asian region (Amsden 1995). And yet 
despite Japan’s rapid economic growth and confident assertions that it would in fact 
rapidly overtake the United States (Fingleton 1995), Japan has not had anything like the 
same degree of ‘hegemonic’ influence that other rising powers have enjoyed before it. 
While Japan may  currently compare unfavourably with the US, there is no doubt that it 
remains a major economic actor, and so this lack relative lack of political influence needs 
explaining.  
 
If we step back for a moment and situate capitalist development and the concomitant rise 
and fall of ‘great powers’ in the sort of longer time-frame adopted by the French historian 
Fernand Braudel (1992),  something is particularly striking: fortunate nations enjoy 
particular advantages at certain times which allow them to dominate an era economically 
(see also, Kennedy 1988). This economic superiority provides the material basis with 
which a nation may attempt to establish a broader political order that reflects and furthers 
its own interests. In short, one nation may become the hegemonic power of a particular 
time. The two definitive examples of states that have enjoyed a dominant or hegemonic 
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position are Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the second half of 
the twentieth. In each case these nations were not only the dominant economic powers of 
their day, but they generated both a concomitant legitimating ideology and the requisite 
institutional infrastructure for an international trade and investment regime that defined a 
specific world order (Cox 1987). 
 
It is important to note that when we talk about ‘hegemony’ there are a number of 
distinctive uses of the term which broadly reflect liberal and radical perspectives. Both 
paradigms make normative assumptions about the possible role a hegemonic power may 
play in either underwriting a stable international order or exploiting its dominant position. 
Although a detailed examination of these differences is not possible here,1 the key point 
to emphasize is that the historical record suggests that rising powers like Japan may be 
expected to challenge the existent order and try to translate their own economic power 
into political influence (Chase-Dunn 1998: 184). Yet despite Japan’s rise to economic 
prominence it has made comparatively little effort to shape the international system of 
which it is a part, even at the regional level. To understand why, we need to look more 
closely at Japan’s relationship with  the United States, a country that remains at the apex 
of what is essentially a unipolar international order (Matsanundo 1997). 
 
Japan and the United States 
 
The defining influence on Japan’s foreign policy and the nature of its economic 
interaction with Southeast Asia occurred more than fifty years ago. Japan’s defeat in 
World War II and its subsequent occupation by US forces under General Douglas 
MacArthur exerted a profound and lasting influence upon Japan (LaFeber 1997). Not 
only did the Americans give the Japanese a new constitution which enshrined the idea of 
Japan as a non-aggressive power, but they effectively incorporated Japan into an 
emerging world order in which the US was the strategic and economic lynchpin of the 
capitalist economies. 
 
This is not to suggest either that the US effectively re-made Japan in its own image or 
that Japan was the hapless victim of a preponderant US. On the contrary, not only were 
the Americans unable to eliminate the sort of distinctive Japanese corporate structures 
and bureaucratic practices of which they disapproved (Johnson 1982), but Japan was able 
to exploit and benefit from the emerging Cold War order. The outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950 provided a crucial catalyst for the reconstruction of Japan’s industrial base. 
Yet despite the clear benefits that infusions of US capital and the demands of the Korean 
conflict provided for Japan, this period helped consolidate a bilateral relationship  marked 
by a good deal of dependence and subordination on the Japanese side (Cumings 1997).  
 
It is important to emphasise, however, that the self-effacing and subordinate character of 
Japan’s post-war foreign policy has been self-consciously pursued and intentional: 
  
Japan’s political passivity in the post-war era has ordinarily been understood as a product 
of wartime trauma, the unconditional surrender, popular pacifism, nuclear allergy, the 
restraints of a ‘peace constitution’, and sometimes bureaucratic immobilism. All of these 
factors are without question ingredients in forming Japan’s post-war international role; they 
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have established the parameters within which political leadership has operated. 
Nevertheless, we would miss the essence of post-war Japanese leadership if we overlooked 
the fact that the fundamental orientation toward economic growth and political passivity 
was also the product of a carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy 
(Pyle 1988: 452 [emphasis added]).  
 
This preoccupation with economic development at all costs, while simultaneously 
keeping a low diplomatic profile, came to be known as the ‘Yoshida doctrine’, after 
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who established many of  Japan’s policy priorities in 
the immediate  post-war period. Japan was able to take advantage of the US’s 
overarching Cold War strategic preoccupations and concentrate national resources on 
economic development, spending comparatively little on its own defence. Significantly, 
even when Japan can afford to provide for its own defence and the US has actively 
encouraged it to do more ‘burden sharing’, Japan’s relatively modest military spending 
and posture lends a highly distinctive trait to its overall external orientation (Pyle 1998). 
 
Japan’s dependence on the US extends across a number of areas and has important 
effects, some beneficial, some not. Not only is Japan reliant on the US strategically, but 
Japan’s economic development has been similarly dependent on maintaining access to 
lucrative US markets. One of the most striking aspects of the US-Japan bilateral trade 
relationship is that the seemingly inexorable increase in Japan’s trade surpluses that 
underpinned Japanese economic development has been mirrored by a similar increase in 
US trade deficits (Bergsten and Noland 1993). This has led to a seemingly interminable  
series of trade disputes between Japan and the US and concerted pressure by the latter to 
force Japan to open up  domestic markets and liberalise its financial sector. Although the 
continuation of these disputes suggests that American pressure has had only limited 
success in forcing change and liberalisation in Japan, it is important to recognise that 
such pressure has had an impact, especially where domestic forces in Japan are 
sympathetic to the liberalisation agenda (Schoppa 1997). In other words, while Japan has 
clearly benefited from its relationship with the US, the latter does have a good deal of 
potential leverage that at the very least constrains Japan, and which may be gradually 
eroding the close relationships that have existed between Japan’s industrial and financial 
sectors (Leyshon 1994). The possible implications of such structural changes within 
Japan’s distinctive political-economy will be considered in greater detail later. The point 
to emphasize at this stage is that the perceived need to accommodate the US has 
constrained Japanese policy options and placed limits on its own hegemonic ambitions 
and potential. 
 
One of the most tangible manifestations of the US’s potential influence on Japanese 
policy was the so-called Plaza Accord, under which Japan agreed to encourage the yen’s 
appreciation against the dollar (Funabashi 1988). This ultimately led to a major 
restructuring of Japanese industry and a dramatic increase in Japanese investment, 
particularly in the rest of Asia. Before we consider this development and its effects in any 
detail, however, it is necessary to situate this process in the wider context of Japan’s 
attitude to economic security more generally. For if there is one factor which 
distinguishes Japanese policy in either its proactive or reactive modes, it is the 
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overwhelming desire to maintain economic independence and enhance economic security 
wherever possible. 
 
Economic security 
 
At the heart of Japan’s trade and industry policies has been a determination to overcome 
perceived insecurity (Samuels 1994). The very process of modernisation from its earliest 
days during the Meiji Restoration period was given urgency and legitimacy by the 
perceived need to ‘catch-up’ with the industrialised West, or risk being left behind and at 
the mercy of more powerful external forces. The neomercantalist trade and industry 
policies which have attracted both condemnation  and admiration were intended to 
systematically develop an independent wealth-generating capacity that would make Japan 
more autonomous and less vulnerable to forces beyond its control. But for a country 
lacking in many of the basic  resources necessary for successful industrialisation, it has of 
necessity been forced to rely on external supplies of key economic inputs. The ‘oil 
shocks’ of the 1970s, which saw dramatic increases in the cost of one of Japan’s most 
crucial sources of energy, dramatically brought home to Japanese planners just how 
potentially vulnerable the country was to events over which it had little control.  
 
In 1980 this perceived vulnerability culminated  in the doctrine of ‘comprehensive 
security’. Simply put, the policy of comprehensive security ‘views diplomatic, economic 
and cultural initiatives to be as important as military means in guaranteeing Japan’s 
security’ (Nester 1990: 70). In many ways this more encompassing conception of 
security, which embraces non-military factors as a major component of and means to 
ensuring national security, reflects a more widespread East Asian perception - one that 
Japan’s success has been instrumental in consolidating (Beeson 1999b). Indeed, the 
Japanese approach to security may be understood as reflecting a long-term historical shift 
in which military power and  security generally have come to occupy  a less prominent 
position than economic development in the priorities of many policy-makers (Luttwak 
1990). In an era when military force - at least between the established major powers - has 
become less effective or utilizable expression of national power (Mueller 1989), 
economic power has become increasingly important. Japan, therefore, is the 
quintessential example of a modern ‘trading state’, which makes its way in the world by 
economic rather than military expansion (Rosecrance 1986). 
 
Japan is not, however, the only contemporary state that might be thought of as a 
successful trading state. A number of Western European countries, particularly Germany, 
may be considered in the same way. What distinguishes Japan is the nature of its 
domestic political-economy and the way this is linked with the outside world. The close 
relationships between key officials in prominent bureaucratic departments like the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
on the one hand, and members of Japan’s corporate sector on the other, has meant that 
economic policy has been coordinated with the intention of systematically developing 
Japan’s industrial structure and technological capacity. The efficacy of such collaborative 
efforts, especially in the ‘high growth period’ of Japan’s early post-war recovery, has 
been widely documented and is generally well understood (see, for example, Freeman 
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1987; Weiss and Hobson 1995). What is generally less well recognized is the way that 
Japanese public officials and business leaders have utilized and built upon such 
institutionalized relationships and practices to manage even the internationalization of 
‘Japanese’ industry.2 
 
It is at this point, where Japan’s highly developed capacity for coordinated public policy 
intersects with the pursuit of international economic goals, that Japan’s distinctive quasi-
hegemony is most apparent and important.  In the wake of the economic traumas of the 
1970s, Japanese policymakers embarked upon a very deliberate policy of supplier and 
resource diversification that minimized Japanese dependence on external suppliers. A 
central element of this strategy was the development of coordinated public and private 
sector activities designed to secure Japan’s resource supplies, while simultaneously 
furthering the interests of Japanese business (Bobrow and Kurdle 1987). Significantly, 
the pattern of  coordinated  public and private sector activities which had characterized 
Japan’s domestic development was extended to the international sphere. This style of 
collaboration reached its most sophisticated form in Japan’s official development 
assistance (ODA). Ostensibly intended to provide developmental assistance to poorer 
countries, Japan has utilized its ODA to promote a number of strategic objectives that 
reflect Japan’s national interest and assist the international expansion of Japanese 
corporations. While this is not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, what distinguishes the 
Japanese approach to ODA is the ‘structural inclusion’ of Japanese business in the 
construction and implementation of policy. The key objective of ODA is the promotion 
of Japanese trade and investment  and the coordination of ‘the commercial agendas of 
private sector actors…with the strategic and economic agendas of the economic 
ministries’ (Arase 1994: 172). 
 
This pattern of close collaboration is coming under sustained pressure from a complex 
array of domestic and external forces, as well as more general  structural pressures that 
are being generated by the evolving international political economy. Before speculating 
on what implications such changes may have for both Japan and the region of which it is 
a part, we need to examine the historical record of Japan’s involvement in the region 
generally and with Southeast Asia in particular. 
 
Japan and Southeast Asia 
 
Japan’s relationship with Southeast Asia, like its external relationships and international 
position more generally, has been powerfully shaped by events that occurred before and 
during World War II. Consequently, before looking in any detail at recent developments 
and the specifics of Japan’s political and economic involvement in the region, it is 
important to remind ourselves briefly of the region’s history as it continues to cast a long 
shadow over contemporary intra-regional relations. 
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The war-time legacy 
 
Japan’s occupation of Southeast Asia prior to World War II is not simply an important 
historical episode that continues to colour contemporary relations; it also provides a 
important illustration of the changing nature and application of power between nations.  
 
As the first nation to industrialise successfully in Asia, Japan borrowed much from the 
West. In addition to embarking on a Western-inspired modernisation of  domestic 
political, bureaucratic and economic institutions, however, the Japanese also embarked 
on the sort of imperial expansion that had characterised competition between the major 
European powers toward the end of the nineteenth century in particular (Hobsbawm 
1987). Japan’s expansion into a weak China and Korea, particularly in the face of 
Russia’s imperial ambitions,  was the almost inevitable consequence of its successful 
industrialization and growing militarism (Beasley 1990). Indeed, the occupation of  
Manchuria, its exploitation as an economic resource, and its usefulness to Japan’s 
authoritarian leaders as a source of mass mobilization imparted a certain logic to 
subsequent events (Young 1998). Imperial expansion, especially into the ‘inner-ring’ of 
Northeast Asia made sense in the context of an era in which the occupation and 
colonization of foreign lands not only provided potential economic benefits, but was an 
established, if not legitimate, form of international behavior. 
 
Japan’s expansion into Southeast Asia, however, while superficially driven by similar 
imperatives, had distinctive qualities that made it an altogether more uncertain enterprise. 
The underlying logic of Japan’s move into Southeast Asia was the same as it had been in 
Northeast Asia – securing natural resources to fuel further economic development and 
eventually developing export markets to pay for them (Beasley 1987). What lent a 
particular danger and urgency to this project in Southeast Asia was that firstly, it was 
largely under the control of the European colonial powers, and secondly,  the US was 
becoming increasingly concerned about Japan’s imperial ambitions, especially when 
combined with rising militarism and nationalism. Any move into Southeast Asia, 
therefore, inevitably risked a clash with both the European powers and, more 
significantly in the long run, an increasingly powerful US. Significantly, it was the US’s 
economic embargo introduced in 1940 - and its explicit threat to Japan’s autonomy and 
economic security – that provided the trigger for conflict. Japan’s dependency on 
Southeast Asia for crucial supplies of natural resources like oil and rubber left it with few 
options if it wanted to maintain economic independence (Willmott 1982). 
 
Japan’s goal of establishing a so-called ‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ in the 
region as a response to perceived threats to its economic security is, therefore, important 
for  a number of reasons. When seen from the longer term perspective of regional 
development what is significant about the putative Co-prosperity Sphere was that, 
Japan’s self-serving imperial interests notwithstanding, it represented the first exclusively 
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Asian regional entity, and one which self-consciously repudiated the style and legitimacy 
of Western European colonization. Japan was bent on the self-appointed task of liberating 
Asia from the yoke of Western imperial rule – something that could only be achieved by 
substituting Japanese regional hegemony (Beasley 1987: 243). Seen in this context, 
Japanese occupation was a crucial watershed in Southeast Asia’s political development 
which effectively marked the end of European control and signaled the emergence of the 
independence and nationalist movements that would prove so influential in countries like 
Indonesia and Vietnam (Yahuda 1996). But Japan’s occupation also revealed the 
difficulties of sustaining long-term economic control of occupied territories in the face of 
internal and especially external opposition. It was a lesson that would profoundly 
influence post-war Japanese policy. 
 
Thus, Japan’s war-time colonization of Southeast Asia had ambiguous but deep-seated 
effects: on the one hand it played a crucial role in freeing the region from European 
imperial control. On the other, it engendered a lingering nervousness and suspicion of 
Japan’s hegemonic ambitions which has continued to influence intra-regional relations to 
the present day. This war-time legacy helps to explain the style and content of Japan’s 
more recent interaction within the region. 
 
Japan’s post-war  involvement in Southeast Asia 
 
The key point to make about Japan’s post-war external relations generally, and its 
involvement with Southeast Asia in particular, is that it is overwhelmingly economic, and 
currently spearheaded by business not battalions. The repudiation of militarism in Japan 
has become a deeply entrenched and institutionalized part of Japanese social life and 
normative values (Katzenstein 1996). While the Japanese government continues to enjoy 
a good deal of support for policies which privilege Japan’s economic interests, there is 
simply no foreseeable likelihood of this translating into the sort of military aggression 
that characterized its earlier foray into the region. In other words, Japan represents a new 
and distinctive approach to national development that sees security as flowing from the 
enhancement of its overall ‘technoeconomic’ position. Significantly, there has not been 
an inevitable correlation with, or translation of, this increased material capacity into 
military advantage in the way conventional international relations theory might lead us to 
expect (see, Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). Japanese hegemony, in short, is truncated,  
selective and very different from other historical exemplars. 
 
The most tangible aspect of Japan’s engagement with the region has been through trade 
and investment. It is possible to identify a number of distinct phases in Japan’s post-war 
economic relations with Southeast Asia. In the first period from 1950-1965, Japan 
occupied what Morris-Suzuki (1991: 138) describes as an ‘intermediate’ position in a 
triangular Asia-Pacific relationship, in which Japan imported industrial goods from the 
US and exported simple manufactures to Southeast Asia.3 At this time, before Japan had 
completed its own industrial transformation, it actually ran trade deficits with the US. 
The next phase of Japan’s economic engagement with the region from 1965-75 saw the 
maturing of Japan’s own economic position and the beginning of Japan’s large-scale 
investment in the region. As the economies of Southeast Asia began to develop they 
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employed a combination of tariffs and inducements to promote domestic 
industrialization. Japan responded to this by massively increasing investment in order to 
protect markets and take advantage of cheaper production costs in Southeast Asia. During 
this decade Asia became the biggest recipient of Japanese manufacturing investment, 
especially in areas such as textiles, which Japanese planners encouraged to move off-
shore in a continuing and systematic attempt to up-grade Japan’s domestic industrial 
structure. 
 
It should be noted that precisely the same logic that encouraged Japanese investment in 
this second phase – protecting markets and overcoming tariff barriers – was also driving 
investment in other parts of the world. The US has been the biggest single recipient of 
Japanese investment, largely as a consequence of protectionist pressures. What is 
significant about Japan’s investment in Asia is the large number of Japanese companies 
involved (Machado 1995: 46), and the impact that even a portion of Japan’s outward 
investment flows can have on the comparatively small economies of Southeast Asia in 
particular.4 Indeed, it is important to recognize that one of the major attractions from a 
Japanese perspective of further investment in the region after 1975 has been as a 
continuation of the triangular relationship with the US. The structure of this triangular 
relationship has changed profoundly, however. More recently, as Japanese industry has 
continued to develop and consequently capture increased shares of the US market in 
particular, investment in Southeast Asia has provided a method of deflecting or 
circumventing protectionism in the US by establishing export platforms in the region 
(Petri 1992). 
 
The Plaza Accord, mentioned earlier, provided an additional impetus for a fresh wave of 
Japanese foreign investment that gained momentum during the 1980s. This episode 
illustrates how important developments in the wider international system generally, and 
with the US in particular, can be in shaping what appear at first glance to be strictly 
regional outcomes. The dramatic appreciation of the yen encouraged by the US-inspired 
Plaza Accord, combined with the abundance of capital available at the height of the 
‘bubble economy’ in Japan in the late 1980s, lent additional momentum to Japan’s 
increased foreign investment. It is worth emphasizing that so great was the outflow of 
capital during the second half of the 1980s, that it exceeded Japan’s total accumulated 
capital exports up until 1980 (Stevens 1996:72). The economies of Asia proved to be 
major beneficiaries of not only this general outflow, but even of the reduced flows that 
resulted in the wake of the bubble economy’s collapse.5 
 
In the 1990s, an emphasis on cost-cutting and a need to increase competitiveness made 
production in low-cost Asia increasingly attractive. Asia’s share of Japan’s total foreign 
investment flows doubled from 11.8 per cent in 1985 to 23.7 per cent in 1994. Of this,  
the so-called ‘first-tier’ economies (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea) 
saw their share decline from 54 to 41.3 per cent, while the ‘second tier’ industrializing 
economies of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) saw 
their share expand from 45 to 56 per cent between 1985 and 1994 (Thompson and Poon 
1998: 18). Between 1980 and 1992, Japan overtook the US to become the largest investor 
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in all of the first and second tier nations with the exception of the Philippines - a former 
US colony (Dobson 1997: 8).6  
 
The precise contemporary significance of Japan to the region can be seen more clearly in 
Table 1. Not only is Japan a major trade and investment partner for all the Southeast 
Asian economies, but it is also an important source of tourist income, especially for 
Thailand. The other important point that emerges from these figures is that a significant 
proportion of the debt owed by the countries of the region is denominated in yen – 
making them vulnerable to fluctuations in currency values that have more to do with the 
state of the Japanese economy than they may with their own. Interestingly, however, 
there appears to have been little attempt by the Japanese government to translate this 
latent power into political influence through the formation of a ‘yen bloc’ (Frankel 1993). 
Moon and Rhee (1999) account for this inaction by arguing that on the one hand Japan’s 
domestic capital markets are underdeveloped, and on the other, ‘Japan wants to take the 
benefit but not the burden and responsibility of the internationalization of the yen’. In 
other words, not only is Japan unwilling to play an overt political leadership role in this 
context, but financial authorities may be concerned about a possible erosion of Japanese 
autonomy as a consequence of the yen’s greater internationalization. Again, the limits to 
Japanese hegemony are apparent, and confirmed by its inability to play a more decisive 
role in managing the recent crisis. 
 
Table 1. Signficance of Japan and the yen to Southeast Asia (%), 1997. 
 Proportion of 
debt 
denominated in 
yen 
Proportion of 
exports destined 
for Japan 
Proportion of 
imports sourced 
from Japan 
Proportion of in-
coming tourists 
from Japan 
Proportion of 
FDI from Japan 
Indonesia 39.5 21.0 18.0 16.6 6.8 
Korea 54.0 15.0 25.6 13.4 23.1 
Thailand 23.0 10.8 19.2 42.9 7.9 
Malaysia 
 
15.0 12.6 21.9 5.0 9.9 
Philippines 
 
25.0 16.2 20.6 7.1 36.8 
China 
 
32.0 17.4 20.3 23.0 19.0 
Average 31.4 15.5 20.9 18.0 17.3 
Source: Bhaskaran (1998) 
 
 
While the extent of Japanese investment in the region has clearly been a major factor in 
accelerating the industrialization process in Southeast Asia in particular, the way this has 
occurred has influenced the course of development and the role the economies of the 
region have played in an emerging regional division of labor. In short, Japan’s distinctive 
quasi-hegemony has powerfully shaped the political-economy of Southeast Asia in ways 
that merit closer scrutiny. 
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Japanese hegemony in practice 
 
One of the more noteworthy transformations in public policy over the course of the last 
several decades, especially in the developing world, has been a change in the way foreign 
investment is regarded. Whereas it was formerly viewed with suspicion and caution, it is 
now the subject of intense inter-national competition as governments throughout the 
world actively court footloose multinational corporations. Despite this enthusiasm, the 
activities of Japanese corporations serve to remind us that, firstly, all foreign investment 
and multinational behavior is not identical (Encarnation 1994); secondly, that even 
multinationals retain distinctive ‘national’ characteristics (Pauly and Reich 1997); and 
that finally, there may still be costs as well as benefits to foreign investment. 
 
Revealingly, Japanese corporations were initially ‘reluctant multinationals’ (Doner 1991: 
83). Because Japanese large-scale corporations or keiretsu groups benefit from their 
distinctive structure of closely inter-linked companies, established networks of suppliers, 
and privileged access to capital,7 they were concerned about the possible impact of 
breaking up such institutionalized patterns of relationships if forced to move off-shore 
into alien environments. The corporations solved this problem by reproducing the 
keiretsu structures throughout the rest of Asia (Dobson 1993). The hierarchically 
organized corporate structures that had developed in Japan and which seemed to have 
given Japanese corporations clear competitive advantages for many years were 
transferred overseas as smaller supplier companies followed their keiretsu group leaders 
off-shore. Even where Japanese corporations used local suppliers, this was not 
necessarily an unqualified boon for the local economy. As Hatch and Yamamura’s (1996) 
detailed analysis of the economic and political relationship between Japan and Asia 
demonstrates, local suppliers were also integrated into a complex, hierarchically 
organized regional division of labor centered on Japan. This Japan-centric production 
structure had a potentially negative impact on indigenous development: Japan controlled 
‘subordinate’ firms in Asia by strictly controlling access to technology and know-how, 
effectively determining the pace and quality of local industrialization (Hatch and 
Yamamura 1996: 60).8 
 
Japan’s possible role in either promoting or hindering economic development is an 
important determinant of its capacity to play a wider, more orthodox hegemonic role at 
the regional level. The conventional wisdom in Japan itself, assiduously promoted by 
influential Japanese economists, is that Japan would spearhead a ‘flying geese’ model of 
region-wide development.9 Japan as ‘lead goose’, would pull other countries along in its 
wake, allowing the rest of the region to replicate its own developmental experience. 
However, critics argue that Japan has neither passed on technology to the rest of the 
region, nor has it  acted as a market to allow neighbors to pursue the sort of export-led 
industrialization that characterized Japan’s own development (Bernard and Ravenhill 
1995). Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of Japan’s trade relationship with the 
region has been that Japan has also amassed major trade surpluses with Asia, predicated 
on the latter’s continuing dependence on exports of Japanese capital goods (Hatch and 
Yamamura 1996: 8-9; Gangopadhyay 1998). 
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In some ways this asymmetrical relationship might be explained as the inevitable 
consequence of the interaction of economies at different stages of development. What 
distinguishes Japan, however, is its highly atypical pattern of low inter-industry trade on 
the one hand (Lincoln 1990), and the co-ordinated, state-assisted approach to regional 
integration on the other. Not only have Japan’s protectionist policies made it unable to 
play the sort of market-of-last-resort role that the US has in the wider international 
system, but policymakers and business-leaders have co-operatively exploited Japan’s 
position to secure the privileges that accrue to economic power. This is not to suggest that 
the US has not utilised its ‘structural power’ to derive benefits from its dominance of the 
international system; on the contrary, it has (Strange 1994). What is significant about 
Japan’s quasi-hegemony is that, especially in the Asian region, it has emerged from the 
consciously-planned, strategically-oriented interaction of Japan’s private and public 
sectors.10 By using a complex array of low-interest loans, technical assistance, 
administrative guidance, labour training programs and especially integrated ODA 
packages, Japanese planners and corporations have attempted to bind the political and 
economic elites of Southeast Asia to them in an intricate web of dependence: 
 
…it would be incorrect to conclude Japan has merely “purchased” influence in Asia. It has 
done much more. In large part, Japanese business and political elites have “schmoozed” 
their way to power. They have, in other words, mastered the fine art of networking in Asia, 
a region in which most countries do not have a modern legal framework for commerce. 
They have used social bonds to overcome what is, for most Western business people, a 
source of confusion, uncertainty, and thus risk (Hatch and Yamamura 1996: 131). 
 
Despite the apparent obstacles to the development of a more expansive form of Japanese 
hegemony that encompasses a political or ideational dimension to match its apparent 
economic influence, Japan has, nevertheless, exerted a wider influence on Southeast Asia 
in particular. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, it has been ambiguous and contradictory. A closer 
look at this more overtly political aspect of Japan’s influence highlights its limits and 
hints at its possible future course. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of Japanese hegemony 
 
Japan’s economic power, as we have seen, has established a regional division of labour 
with its apex in Japan that effectively locks neighbouring countries into subordinate 
positions. This is most dramatically illustrated in the structure of regional car production, 
where major Japanese corporations have taken advantage of improvements in 
transportation and communication, and the possibilities that the increasing disaggregation 
of production processes opens up, to organise manufacture on a trans-regional basis. 
Toyota, for example, uses Thailand to supply diesel engines and electronics, the 
Philippines for transmissions, Malaysia for steering components, and Indonesia for petrol 
engines. Given the important role Japanese multinationals play in local economies, this 
has led directly to political initiatives designed to encourage further investment and 
distinguish Southeast Asia in the international competition for mobile investment. 
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia have, for example, inaugurated a 
brand-to-brand ‘complementation pact’, which halves tariffs on imports from member 
 13
countries and thus makes the region more attractive to Japanese multinationals that 
operate according to a transnational logic (Machado 1995).  
 
At the material level, then, there is a clear correlation between sheer economic might and 
a concomitant political influence. But Japan also has a more subtle ideational influence 
which, somewhat paradoxically, also highlights the limits of Japanese hegemony. On the 
one hand, the success of the Japanese model has clearly had a major impact on the region. 
Malaysia’s attempted emulation of the Japanese model in its ‘Look East’ policy is 
perhaps the clearest example of this ideational influence (Jomo 1994: 3-10). On the other, 
the continuing difficulties experienced by the Japan’s domestic economy throughout the 
1990s must cast doubt on the continuance of this dimension of its regional influence. 
Powerful and persuasive criticisms have been made of Japan’s domestic political-
economy, making it a less attractive role model (Katz 1998). Likewise, the continuing  
difficulties experienced by Japan’s heavily indebted banking sector in particular mean 
that Japan has become a less important source of external capital (The Economist 1999), 
and thus a potentially less influential regional power. 
 
And yet Japan has had opportunities to play a political role in the region in keeping with 
its economic status. In the aftermath of the recent economic crisis in Asia when Japan 
suggested that it might establish an Asian Monetary Fund to help neighbouring 
economies weather the crisis, it appeared that Japan might finally play a decisive and 
unambiguous leadership role. Such a possibility was rapidly squashed by the US, 
however, in an episode which revealed much about both the US’s continuing regional 
influence and Japan’s continuing subordination (Higgott 2000). In sharp contrast to 
Japan, the US was able to exploit its pre-eminent position in, and influence over, a 
number of key inter-governmental organisations like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), in a concerted attempt to impose its preferred model of economic organisation on 
the East Asian region (Beeson 1999c). US hegemony is bolstered by an uncomplicated 
and uncritical certitude about its ‘manifest destiny’ and perceived obligation to act as a 
world leader (Nye 1990). Revealingly, despite the US’s relative economic decline in the 
post-war period, it has been able to maintain its dominant position in part by the 
aggressive promotion of an ideational agenda that reflects its own interests and normative 
values. Despite Japan’s increasing economic presence in key international institutions 
like the World Bank and the IMF, it has been unable to articulate, let alone realise its own 
distinctive vision for an international political and economic order. 
 
Similar inhibitions and uncertainties have prevented Japan from either endorsing or 
playing a leading role in an exclusively regional economic grouping, such as the East 
Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposed by Malaysia’s premier, Mahathir Mohamed. 
Although the possibility that an exclusively Asian, region-wide grouping will develop 
remains alive, particularly because of the prominent role played by the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),11 Japan’s role in it remains uncertain. Not only do 
Japanese policymakers still seem reluctant to confront or antagonise a US upon which it 
remains strategically and economically dependent,12 but Japanese people more generally 
have had a long-standing ambivalence toward ‘Asia’ and Japan’s place in it (Funabashi 
1995: 231). As a consequence of these contradictory influences and pressures, Japan has 
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found it difficult to present an agenda of its own that extends beyond narrow national 
self-interest. 
 
A number of major criticisms have been made of Japan in this regard. First, critics argue 
that  Japanese foreign policy has been too ‘reactive’, unduly influenced by external 
pressures on the one hand, and hamstrung by bureaucratic in-fighting on the other (Calder 
1988). Second, and more fundamentally, it is argued that because Japan does not possess 
the sorts of universalisable principles that have been such a prominent part of the liberal 
world order constructed by US hegemony, it cannot hope to play a similar international 
role (Rapkin 1990). In other words, Japan does not possess a vision or cluster of values 
that might provide both an agenda for the future, nor a salve for the past. Indeed, Japan’s 
continuing inability to come to terms with and acknowledge the often brutal role it played 
during World War II remains a major obstacle to its assuming a more prominent regional 
role; many of Japan’s neighbours are actually happy to see Japan’s continuing strategic 
dependence on the US precisely because of the doubts engendered by this lingering war-
time legacy. Paradoxically enough, therefore, despite the declining importance of military 
as opposed to economic power, the US’s overall hegemonic position continues to be 
bolstered by its dominant strategic position. In East Asia’s complex intra-regional 
relations, the US may continue to play an important - and generally welcome - 
‘balancing’ role (Ross 1999), underwriting regional stability, but effectively placing 
limits on Japan’s own regional ambitions. 
 
Despite Japan’s overwhelming economic presence, which leads some commentators to 
claim that Japan has already  become a ‘regional political superpower’ (Drifte 1996: 
164), there are plainly a number of constraints which continue to circumscribe Japan’s 
role and delimit the nature of its hegemonic influence or capacity. Even though Japan’s 
economic power gives it the chance to play a more prominent role in a number of 
increasingly influential transnational agencies (Yasutomo 1993), the comparatively 
lacklustre recent performance of its own economy is making it more difficult to translate 
economic power into political influence – at least at the formal level of inter-state 
relations. Compounding this problem – and giving the lie to simplistic notions of ‘Japan 
Inc’ or a seamless and unproblematic ‘national interest’ – has been domestic policy 
contestation between the manufacturing and financial sectors, which have very different 
opinions about the appropriate value of the yen (Wade 1998: 702). Ironically, what had 
been Japan’s most unambiguous asset – the strength and performance of its economy – 
has now become a source of concern and criticism both internationally and domestically. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
If we take the notion of hegemony to mean the capacity to exert a political and economic 
influence beyond domestic borders with the intention of furthering perceived national 
interests, then Japan clearly has claims to such status, albeit at a predominantly regional 
level and with a number of important caveats. The most important constraint on Japanese 
hegemony flows from its relationship with the US: not only is the US a global hegemon 
and thus inevitably able to shape the wider international system in a manner that Japan 
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cannot, but Japan remains dependent on the US to underwrite its own security in ways 
that reinforce its subordinate position. Yet we also need to recognise that in many ways 
Japan has systematically and self-consciously eschewed militarism in favour of a single-
minded neo-mercantlism that has defined and delimited its own potential influence. As a 
consequence, Japanese hegemony while novel and – within specific limits – highly 
effective, is also constrained and somewhat subterranean. 
 
Through a complex array of ODA packages, investment strategies, and trade linkages, the 
collaborative efforts of Japanese political and business elites have clearly exerted a major 
influence on the much smaller economies of East Asia generally and Southeast Asia in 
particular. Governments and policy-makers across the region have attempted to 
accommodate, or self-consciously emulate, the style and content of Japan’s public policy 
initiatives. This is plainly evidence of Japanese hegemony at both the overt material level 
of investment flows and production strategies, and at the more subtle ideational level as a 
role model. Yet given that Japan’s ideational influence has largely been a consequence of 
its success as the original East Asian development state, and that that model is now 
subject to widespread criticism and scrutiny both outside and inside Japan, then there are 
grounds for questioning whether even this limited influence will continue to be as 
significant as it was. Indeed, seasoned observers suggest that Japan itself is being 
subjected to a fundamental ‘regime shift’, which is transforming many of the established 
relationships and practices that were associated with the Japanese developmental state 
(Pempel 1998).  
 
Thus, to understand the transformations that are underway in Japan, and the possible 
impact they may have on its external relations, we need to consider both the politics and 
economics of Japan and the complex inter-relationships that bind them together. Indeed, 
seen from a political-economy perspective it becomes clear that ‘Japan’ is a far more 
complex, less unified entity than such a label implies. While an overwhelming imperative 
for reconstruction and catching-up existed, and where policy generated unambiguous 
gains, such differences were repressed in the ‘national interest’. Now that Japan’s 
distinctive model of state-led development has not only accomplished its task, but is 
actually perceived to be an impediment to necessary reform, possible conflicts of interest 
have become more apparent. Japan’s apparent inability to resolve its own domestic 
problems, especially when combined with its failure to act decisively or effectively 
during the Asian economic crisis, has seriously undermined its leadership credentials.  
 
Yet whatever outcomes Japan’s domestic economic, and by extension political, 
difficulties generate, one thing is certain: Japan will continue to exert a major influence 
over the countries of Southeast Asia. The sheer size of the Japanese economy and the 
existent network of relationships and production networks throughout the region means 
that Japan will continue to benefit from an embedded structure of influence for the 
foreseeable future. Whether Japan can translate this into a more overt political leadership 
in the region - one that is capable of transcending its problematic historical relationships 
with both the countries of the region and with the US - is another question. Unless it can, 
Japan will remain a somewhat contradictory, paradoxical and quasi-hegemonic presence 
in the region. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 For a more detailed examination of theories of hegemony see, Beeson (1999a). 
2 Although Japanese industry remains more characteristically ‘Japanese’ than some of its 
competitors, the whole question of the internationalization of industry raises a number of 
complex questions about what constitutes a ‘national’ company in an era of increased 
international integration where both the ownership structure and spatial configuration of 
an individual company make the question of national identity increasingly problematic. 
For a discussion of these issues, see Beeson (2000). 
3 This discussion draws heavily on Morris-Suzuki (1991). 
4 Richard Stubbs (1999: 239) makes the interesting point that the flood of Japanese 
investment into the small economies of Southeast Asia may actually have contributed to 
their problems, by fuelling unrealistic expectations and unsustainable investment 
‘bubbles’. 
5 Constraints of space preclude a detailed examination of the rise and fall of the bubble 
economy, but see Katz (1998) for a useful discussion. 
6 It should also be noted that a new and major source of investment has been intra-Asian 
investment, primarily from the established first tier nations – something that looks set to 
increase in the future and possibly undermine the economic importance of Japan. 
7 For an extremely useful discussion of the keiretsu, see Gerlach (1992). 
8 It should be noted that there is evidence to suggest the ability of Japanese firms to 
control structures of production within the region is limited.  A  number of companies in 
the electronics sector  have developed more ‘open’ coordination mechanisms that give a 
greater, more autonomous role to affiliates. See Ernst (1997). 
9 For a discussion of the flying geese model in particular and about Japanese perspectives 
on regional development more generally, see Korhonen (1994). 
10 This planned approach to regional economic expansion was most apparent in a number 
of proposals put forward by key agencies like MITI (see Unger 1993 for a discussion of 
these schemes). Critics claim that Japanese planners have been intent on recreating the 
Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere by more peaceful means. See Johnson (1993). 
11 The ASEAN summit meeting of late 1999 was most noteworthy for the inclusion of 
Japan, China and South Korea, representing a de facto EAEC grouping.  
12 The link between the US and Japan is not simply the largest bilateral economic  
relationship in the world, but it highlights the contradictory nature of inter-dependence. 
Although Japan clearly wishes to maintain access to the US’s crucial and lucrative 
markets, the US is also deeply dependent on Japanese savings to underwrite its ever-
expanding trade deficits. In many ways, Japan appears to have greater latent structural 
power than the US, what is significant, however, is that it has shown little preparedness to 
utilize it. See Yoshikazu (1997). 
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